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STUDENT NOTES
others,' and the requirement of malice is merely nominal for it is
inferable from the wrongful character of the act." Notwithstanding this tendency to provide greater protection for contract rights,
marriage contracts continue to maintain their unique position as
an exception to the general rule. This is exemplified in the recent
decision of Claraan v. Cosper.'
In that case relief was denied under the following circumstances. The plaintiff and Lillian Drenkhan were engaged to be
married. Her employer, fully cognizant of the fact, feared the
loss of her services, and in order to induce her to break her contract, he became unduly attentive to Lillian, and engaged ini a
questionable sort of conduct. He showered her with gifts and
automobile rides, and raised her salary from $150 to $250 a month.
When Lillian refused to marry the plaintiff, he brought an action
for damages against the employer. A demurrer to the declaration
was sustained, and affirmed on appeal. The court held that the
prevention of a marriage by the interference of a third person
cannot in itself be a legal wrong. The court censured "the shameful conduct of the defendant", and especially "in view of the
fact that he was a married man", but with judicial aloofness announced that "a wrong had been done to the plaintiff for which
the law provides no remedy."
The case is not put upon any
ground of privilege, for the defendant was obviously actuated by
selfishness and bad faith, and his conduct had no legal justification. Moreover, the case was decided on a demurrer, thus obviating
the necessity of discussing the merits of any possible defense. In
view of the insufficiencSr in law of the declaration which charged
malicious and wanton interference with plaintiff's engagement
contract it may be said that the defendant had an unqualified and
conclusive privilege to induce the breach of this type of contract.
Prior cases refusing to recognize a cause of action under similar circumstances, although unsatisfactory in their reasoning,
can be separated into three classes. First,a parent clearly should
have a wide privilege in advising his child, even to the extent of
inducing him to break the contract to marry.' The parental
'Wheeler Stenzel Co. v. American Window Glass Co., 202 Mass. 471, 89 .
E. 28 (1909).
Contra: Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, 15 S. W. 57
(1891).
5Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, supra n. 1. The common law rule that one
who causes a breach of a contract of employment is liable in damages is one
based on common sense and justice . . . . The wilful violation of a known
right constitutes malice.
6160 Wash. 642, 296 Pac. 140 (1931).
'Leonard v. Whetstone, 34 Ind. App. 383, 68 N. E. 197 (1903).
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privilege is absolute. Second, friends of the engaged parties are
extended a similar privilege to advise regarding the merits and
character of the prospective spouse. Before entering into the performance of a contract of such importance as that of marriage,
it is deemed advisable on grounds of social policy that there be no
restriction on the information available to the affianced parties
Third, on grounds of policy a cause of action should not be recognized, lest the courts be opened to suits by every disappointed
lover against his successful rival.' None of the reasons given in
these three types of cases are applicable to the facts of the Clarahan case. The defendant was neither a parent, nor a friend
actuated by a worthy motive, nor a rival for the girl's hand. The
court could well have permitted a recovery without deviating from
stare decisis, for the adjudicated cases can all be explained on the
ground of privilege or policy, whereas the principal case can be
put on neither ground. As a matter of fact the policy of the law
is decidedly favorable towards promotion of marriage and removal
of restrictions on the right to marry.
By far, the greatest influence on the courts seems to be a
statement in Cooley on Torts," which is invariably cited in support of the conclusion reached: "The prevention of a marriage by
the interference of a third person cannot, in general, in itself,
be a legal wrong. Thus if one by solicitations, or by the arts of
ridicule or otherwise, shall induce one to break off an existing
contract of marriage, no action will lie for it however contemptible
and blamable may be the conduct." Singularly enough, the statement is unsupported by authority, but since the cases cite it with
approval,' there is no dearth of judicial sanction behind it. There
is reason to believe that Cooley meant the statement to apply to
conduct short of malicious interference. However that may be,
the cases hold no conduct is actionable as such. Under the absolute privilege, recognized by the (laralian case, to break such a
contract, a defendant may openly flaunt all the spite, ill will,
and malevolence that he is capable of, provided he stops short of
slander, libel, fraud, or other torts well recognized in law. Of
8 Homan v. Hall, 102 Neb. 70, 165 N. W. 881, L. R. A. 1918 C, '1195 and

note.
Sbid.
101 COoLEY ox To.rTs (3d ed. 1906) 494. Even where the marriage is preventea by a forcible separation of the parties, the wrong does not consist
in the loss of the marriage, but rather in assault or false imprisonment.

n Supra, n. 6 and 7.
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course, if the conduct of the defendant amounts to a distinct tort,
the plaintiff is not precluded from suing for such.'
The adjudicated cases are not many and can be briefly reviewed. In Leonard u. Whetstone a parent was held not liable
to her son's fiancee for inducing him to break his contract to
marry her, although the son had seduced the plaintiff and she was
with child. The court declared a parent has a perfect right to
advise his own child to break his contract of marriage, when in the
judgment of the parent the marriage ought not to take place.
The court suggested that in an action of slander against the parent
the breach of contract would be considered as an element of damages. Homan v. Hall" extends a similar privilege to friends of
the engaged parties. The defendant there induced his friend to
break the engagement with the plaintiff by fraudulent misrepresentations that she was of unchaste character. An action of slander
was barred by the statute of limitations.' Consequently the plaintiff was without remedy against her wrongdoer.
Until a marriage is solemnized, the law recognizes no existent
domestic rights between the parties, and a seduction of the plaintiff's promised wife did not give him a cause of action. Such is the
doctrine in Case v. Smith." No action can be based on the alienation of affections, for such a right arises from the marital relation,
and not that of betrothal. By way of dicta it is said that if defendant's conduct had induced the plaintiff's affianced to breach
her contract, as distinguished from the plaintiff's right to
terminate it as the consequence of defendant's act, then the wrong
might be actionable. The dicta is contrary to all the cases already
discussed.
Strangely enough, although the courts are unwilling to hold a
person liable who deliberately interferes with a contract to marry,
where the defendant's negligence had the effect of breaking such a
contract, a cause of action was recognized. In the case of Harriot
v. Plimpton," a physician negligently diagnosed plaintiff's ailment as venereal, whereupon the other party broke the engagement. The physician was held liable; the damage was not too ren. 10.
18upra, n. 7.
i Supra, n. 8.
" The declaration though averred enough facts to constitute a good causo
of action for slander.
18107 Mich. 416, 65 N. W. 279, 31 L. R. A. 282 (1895); Davis v. Condit,
124 Minn. 365, 144 N. W. 1089 (1914).
1-166 Mass. 585, 44 N. E. 992 (1896).
Contra: 117 Ga. 191, 43 S. E. 419
12Supra,

(1903).
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mote to sustain an action. The decision was reached despite the
fact that the plaintiff was seeking information rather than medical
advice. A New York case purports to hold that contracts to marry
will not be distinguished from ordinary contracts in fixing liability
for inducing their breach. But the rule there as to any contract
is said to be that mere malicious interference is not enough to
impose liability. The defendant's act must be fraudulent or tortious in itself."
No case appears to have ever been up for decision in West Virginia on the point under discussion. Our court in Thacker CoaZ
0
Co. v. Burk,"
which involved a contract of employment, held quite
emphatically that a malicious interference with a contract by
enticing servants away from plaintiff's service, inducing them to
violate contracts with their master, is actionable. It is quite
probable though, that when a case arises regarding a contract to
marry, a distinction will be drawn, in view of the law as developed by the preceding cases. It is to be hoped, however, that
if a case arises similar to the Clarahan case, our court will not feel
so bound by precedent that it must deny recovery apologetically as
the court did in that case, and say that "the conduct of the defendant is shameful and contemptible, but a wrong has been done
for which the law provides no remedy." There can be no theoretical objection to allowing a recovery in cases where the defendant
can not shield himself under some kind of justification, for the
theory of recovery is already well-established law in the field of
torts. It is not clear why contracts to marry should be segregated
for special treatment in the absence of privileged conduct.
-AuGuST

W. PETROPLUS.

Guida v. Pontrelli, 186 N. Y. Supp. 147, 114 Misc. Rep. 181 (1921);
Ableman v. Holman, 190 Wis. 112, 208 N. W. 889 (1926). An engagement
contract cannot be the subject of a conspiracy between one of the parties
and a stranger to the contract, for inducing the breach of such a contract
cannot entail any legal responsibility.
10Supra, n. 1.
See Iron Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis Chalmers Co.,
166 Fed. 45, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 315 (C. C. A. 7th 1908) and Martens v.
Reilly, 109 Wis. 494, 84 N. W. 840 (1901).
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